The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights in Trade
Dissertation Committee: Helen V. Milner (chair), James R. Vreeland, and Kristopher W. Ramsay
Who are winners and losers of international protection of intellectual property rights?
How do their conflicts of interest shape the trade policies?
How do institutions and economic interdependence shape the outcome?
In my dissertation, I address these fundamentals of international and comparative political economy and examine why countries agreed to preserve the freedom to use a set of rights and safeguards under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), known as TRIPS Flexibilties. Specifically, I study how WTO members' uses of the trade remedies are bound by their political conditions. In doing so, my thesis uncovers political origins of discontent surrounding TRIPS, including public access to drugs and patent holders' rent-seeking behavior, and shows how the disputes are settled at domestic and international legal institutions.
Ch 1) TRIPS and International Organization: Reputation as a Binding Constraint - How States Navigate TRIPS Flexibilities
Ch 2) TRIPS and Domestic Political Institutions: The Politics of Compulsory Licensing - Democracy and Regulatory Threat in Public Health
Ch 3) TRIPS and Economic Interdependence: Innovation, Imitation, and Political Cleavages in International Trade and Patent Protection